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I. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974'
(ERISA) introduced a new era for a broad spectrum of American
society. The new Act had a startling impact not only upon pension
plan sponsors, participants, and beneficiaries, but also upon the
myriad group of individuals and institutions providing services,
advice, and counsel to the pension industry. This article primarily
will consider the new law as it affects the fiduciary, creating new
responsibilities and increased liability. Several areas in which the
new law creates special problems then will be considered.
The importance of the new fiduciary rules is obvious. First, by
1980 private pension plans will cover approximately forty-two mil-
lion employees and will contain assets valued at approximately 225
billion dollars.2 Thus the private pension industry is a massive and
growing industry.3 A second reason for considering the new fiduciary
rules is that ERISA created an area of dual responsibilities, sanc-
tions, and enforcement methods between the Department of Labor
and the Treasury Department. Prior to ERISA the major enforce-
ment weapon was held by the Internal Revenue Service in the form
of the right to disqualify from tax-exempt status plans in which
prohibited transactions or other fiduciary improprieties occurred.
ERISA removes disqualification as an appropriate sanction and in-
stead substitutes a system of penalties and excise taxes to be levied
upon the fiduciary or party in interest participating in the prohib-
ited transactions. In addition, ERISA adopts a simplified method
for initiating actions against fiduciaries and encourages suit by par-
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 8, 26, 29, 31 &
42 U.S.C. ) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
2. S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4890, 4891.
3. See PRSIDENr's COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT
AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS at vi (1965).
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ticipants, beneficiaries, and the Department of Labor. For these
reasons, it is imperative that all parties participating in the pension
industry become aware of the new fiduciary rules.
II. COVERAGE
At the outset, it is noteworthy that the Labor provisions of
ERISA (Title I) and the Treasury provisions of ERISA (Title II) are
similar but not identical. Throughout this article, reference will be
made to the significant differences. One such area is coverage. Sec-
tion 401 (a) of ERISA provides that the fiduciary responsibility rules
shall apply to all employee benefit plans. This includes both retire-
ment plans and welfare plans.' The term "employee pension benefit
plan" includes plans designed to provide retirement income to em-
ployees or designed to provide a deferral of income by employees for
periods extending beyond the termination of employment.5 On the
other hand, employee welfare benefit plans are plans or programs
established by an employer to provide participants with the follow-
ing: medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits; benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment;
vacation benefits; apprenticeship or other training programs; day
care centers; scholarship funds; or prepaid legal services.' Thus the
Labor provisions apply not only to the general category of pension
plans but also to group insurance programs, health and accident
plans, and medical reimbursement plans. 7 Section 4 of ERISA
excludes from this coverage governmental or church plans, plans
maintained for the purpose of complying with workman's compen-
sation or unemployment compensation laws, plans maintained out-
side of the United States, and excess benefit plans (an unfunded
plan provided by the employer that authorizes benefits in excess of
the limitations imposed by section 415 of the Internal Revenue
Code).
The coverage provisions of Title II are incorporated in new sec-
tion 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code.8 Section 4975(e)(1) defines
"plan" to include a trust described in section 401(a), a plan de-
scribed in sections 403(a) or 405(a) with an accompanying trust
4. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (Supp. V 1975); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3 (1976).
5. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (Supp. V 1975); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2 (1976).
6. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (Supp. V 1975); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1 (1976).
7. Excluded from coverage are unfunded deferred compensation plans maintained for
highly compensated employees and agreements regarding payments to retired or deceased
partners pursuant to § 736 of the Internal Revenue Code. ERISA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(Supp. V 1975).
8. ERISA § 2003, I.R.C. § 4975.
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exempt under section 501, an individual retirement account de-
scribed in section 408, or a retirement bond under section 409. Sec-
tion 4975 also excludes governmental and church plans.9 Thus the
provisions of section 4975, which establish the coverage require-
ments for Title II of ERISA, basically are equivalent to the defini-
tion of employee pension benefit plan as that term is defined in Title
II. Title II by its terms does not cover employee welfare benefit
plans. This distinction is important because the penalties provided
under Title II are not applicable to fiduciaries of employee welfare
benefit plans.
III. WHO ARE FmUCLkRIES?
Once it is determined whether a particular plan is covered by
the fiduciary responsibility rules of either Title I or Title II of
ERISA, the next problem is to determine who are fiduciaries, par-
ties in interest, or disqualified persons as those terms are defined by
ERISA. An understanding of these terms is essential to an apprecia-
tion of the application of the fiduciary standards and the prohibited
transaction rules.
Section 3(21) of ERISA and section 4975(e)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code define the term "fiduciary."'" The term includes any-
one who exercises discretion in the management of assets, renders
investment advice for a fee, or possesses discretionary authority
with regard to plan administration. The broadness of the definition
is readily apparent. Plan officers, directors, and members of the
investment or administrative committee are certainly fiduciaries
since they exercise discretionary authority or control over plan man-
agement and asset disposition. Similarly, officers and directors of
the plan sponsor are fiduciaries if they exercise control through the
selection of the investment committee, administrative committee,
or plan officers or directors." Because the definition includes those
who render investment advice for a fee, the following persons may
be considered fiduciaries: insurance salesmen who recommend the
purchase of certain types of insurance and receive a commission on
the sale of such insurance; attorneys who counsel the employer,
investment committee, or trustee with regard to an appropriate
investment portfolio mix or with regard to specific investments, and
9. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(g).
10. Id. § 411, 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. V 1975), prohibits certain persons with criminal
records from acting in a fiduciary capacity with regard to pension plans.
11. S. REP. No. 93-1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 323 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
CONFERENCE REPORT].
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receive a fee for these services; or an actuary. An actuary or pension
consultant also may be included in the definition if he renders simi-
lar advice concerning plan management or asset investment for a
fee. Finally, the term may include stock brokers or dealers who
recommend certain securities and then participate in the acquisi-
tion or disposition of securities and receive a commission for their
services.
The Conference Committee Report on ERISA indicates that
the ordinary functions of consultants and advisors to a pension plan
(other than investment advisors) generally may not be considered
fiduciary functions. The Report, however, points out that there may
be situations when consultants or advisors exercise discretionary
authority or control with respect to the management or administra-
tion of a plan or its assets because of their special expertise. In these
situations they will be deemed to have assumed fiduciary func-
tions. 2 Regulations issued by the Labor Department and the Treas-
ury Department indicate circumstances under which a person will
be deemed to have rendered investment advice. 3 A person will be
deemed to have rendered investment advice only in the following
circumstances: (1) the person renders advice to the plan concerning
the value of securities or property, or makes recommendations
about the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securi-
ties or other property; and (2) the person either directly or indirectly
(a) has discretionary authority or control with regard to purchasing
or selling securities or other property, or (b) renders any advice with
the understanding that such advice will serve as a primary basis for
investment decisions and that the person will render individualized
investment advice to the plan based on the plan's particular needs
regarding such things as investment policies or strategy, overall
portfolio composition, or plan investment diversification.' 4
Under these regulations, an attorney, pension consultant, ac-
countant, or insurance salesman who is contacted by the plan trus-
tee or administrator on a regular basis to determine the advisability
of certain investments may be considered a fiduciary. If this occurs,
the advisor may become involved in a prohibited transaction be-
cause of the receipt of compensation for services rendered.'5 In a
speech by William J. Kilberg, Solicitor of Labor, certain considera-
12. Id.
13. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-9 (1975); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (1976).
14. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-9 (1975); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (1976).
15. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975); id. § 2003(a),
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(C).
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tions were pointed out as relevant in determining whether a plan
consultant or advisor is a fiduciary.
(1) . . . the extent to which the plan relies on the advice of the advisor, which
in turn may depend on the nature of the consultant's expertise,
(2) the relationship between the advice given and the possibility of harm to
the participants if the advice is followed,
(3) the extent to which the relationship and the advice are disclosed to inter-
ested parties, including plan participants, and
(4) the extent to which the relationship of the consultant to the plan is
subject to the prohibition against party in interest transactions.2 6
These considerations were provided by the Labor Solicitor prior to
the promulgation of the regulations. To what extent they are still
useful in deciding a close case is not clear. It would seem, however,
that the considerations provided by Mr. Kilberg relate specifically
to the last portion of the regulations which require that the advice
be rendered on a regular basis and serve as the primary advice for
investment decisions.
The Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) have issued interpretive bulletins related to the definition of
fiduciaries. Interpretive Bulletin 75-5 indicates that consultants,
attorneys, accountants, and actuaries who render noninvestment
services ordinarily will not be considered fiduciaries. 17 The Interpre-
tive Bulletin adds that they would be considered fiduciaries if they
were acting in any of the manners described under section 3(21) of
the Act. Interpretive Bulletin 75-8 provides that the performance of
certain administrative or ministerial actions within a framework of
rules and regulations that prohibit the exercise of discretion would
not establish a fiduciary status. 18 On the other hand, the Bulletin
points out that some positions such as plan administrator and trus-
tee are inherently fiduciary in nature while other positions assume
a fiduciary status only because of the performance of one of the acts
mentioned in section 3(21) of the Act. The Bulletin further states
that members of the board of directors of the employer are fiduciar-
ies only to the extent that they perform fiduciary functions such as
the selection and retention of other plan fiduciaries. Thus, so long
as they exercise the necessary fiduciary standards in performing
these acts, they would assume no liability (except for possible cofi-
duciary liability that arises under section 405(a) of ERISA). Like-
wise, officers and employees of the employer are not fiduciaries
16. Address by William J. Kilberg, Nov. 21, 1974, reprinted in [1974] 3 PENS. & PROFIT-
SHARING (P-H) 1135,013.
17. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, Question D-1 (1976).
18. Id. § 2509.75-8, Question D-2.
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simply by virtue of their position as an officer or employee. 9 Finally,
Treasury Regulation section 54.4975-9 indicates that an SEC-
registered broker or dealer, a dealer who makes primary markets in
United States securities and reports daily to the New York Federal
Reserve Bank, and a supervised bank are not fiduciaries solely be-
cause they execute securities transactions for a plan in the ordinary
course of their business upon the direction of a fiduciary; provided
that the broker, dealer, or bank is not a fiduciary and the directions
from the fiduciary specify the security to be purchased or sold, a
price range, a purchase or sale time span not to exceed five days and
a minimum or maximum quantity to be purchased or sold. 21 In any
event, all persons who rendered such advice prior to ERISA with
knowledge that they had no liability since they were not trustees
under the plan, must now reevaluate their positions to insure that
they are not fiduciaries participating in prohibited transactions.
One question that is not resolved by ERISA is whether officers
or directors of a corporation that is itself a fiduciary can be classified
as fiduciaries on an individual basis. This arises in a case in which
a bank is a fiduciary of the plan. Will trust officers or other officers
of the bank be fiduciaries in their individual capacities? The evi-
dence is conflicting on this point. Section 412, which establishes the
bonding requirements of ERISA, specifies that every fiduciary and
every person who handles funds of a plan shall be bonded, except
that no bond shall be required of a fiduciary (or any director, officer,
or employee of the fidicuary) if the fiduciary is a corporation author-
ized to exercise trust powers or to conduct an insurance business and
is supervised by a federal or state authority.21 The implication of
this section may be that without this exemption the directors, offi-
cers, and employees of a fiduciary might be required to be bonded.
On the other hand, the bonding requirement could apply to them
because they handle assets of the plan rather than because they fit
the category of a fiduciary. Yet, ERISA Interpretive Bulletin 75-4,
released on June 4, 1975, indicates that a fiduciary may indemnify
the fiduciary's employees who actually perform the fiduciary serv-
ices. 2  This would indicate that a fiduciary's employees performing
fiduciary services are themselves fiduciaries. This interpretation
may be compared with section 3(21)(B) of ERISA. In defining the
term fiduciary, this section of the Act takes the position that the
19. Id., Question D-5.
20. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-9(d)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(d)(1) (1976).
21. ERISA § 412(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(2) (Supp. V. 1975).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (1976).
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investment of money or property of a plan in securities issued by an
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act
of 1940 shall not cause by itself the investment company or such
investment company's investment advisor or principal underwriter
to be deemed to be a fiduciary or a party in interest with regard to
the plan.2? This provision may mean that no exemption is necessary
for officers, directors, or other employees of the investment company
or it may mean that certain officers, employees, and directors of
other fiduciaries that fulfill similar roles to the underwriter or in-
vestment advisor of the investment company may be fiduciaries
under the Act. This area is clearly one that should be addressed by
the Labor Department in regulations. If employees of fiduciaries are
considered fiduciaries in their individual capacities, certainly these
employees will request indemnification by the corporate fiduciary
and perhaps other types of protection.
In addition to those persons who may be deemed fiduciaries by
virtue of the performance of certain of the services listed in section
3(21) of the Act, section 402 requires that every employee benefit
plan be established pursuant to a written instrument that shall
provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally
shall have authority to control and manage the operation and ad-
ministration of the plan. The term "named fiduciary" is defined as
a fiduciary named in the instrument who pursuant to procedures
specified in the plan is identified as a fiduciary by a person who is
an employer or employee organization with respect to the plan. 21
The purpose of a "named fiduciary" is to have at least one person
clearly identified in the trust instrument to whom participants and
beneficiaries may look as a person responsible for administering the
plan. The named fiduciary may appoint others to carry out certain
plan responsibilities (other than responsibilities to manage or con-
trol the assets of the plan) .25 The persons named to carry out fidu-
ciary functions by the named fiduciary will themselves be deemed
fiduciaries under the Act. 21
Two further terms must be defined. The terms "party in inter-
est" and "disqualified person" are used to define the same basic
group of individuals for purposes of the Labor and Treasury titles
respectively. Section 3(14) of ERISA defines the term party in inter-
est for purposes of Title I. Likewise, section 4975(e)(2) defines the
23. ERISA § 3(21)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
24. Id. § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (Supp. V 1975).
25. Id. § 405(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
26. Id. § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (Supp. V 1975).
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term disqualified person for purposes of the Treasury title. The
following summary indicates the persons covered by the definitions
and the differences in the two definitions:
LABOR TITLE TREASURY TITLE
A. Any fiduciary, counsel, or Fiduciary
employee of the plan.
B. A person providing services Same
to the plan.
C. Any employer with employees Same
covered by the plan.
D. Any employee organization Same
with members covered by the
plan.
E. An owner, direct or indirect, Same
of fifty percent or more of i)
the stock of a corporation (either
voting stock or total value of
all stock) ; (ii) the capital or
profit interest of a partner-
ship; or (iii) the beneficial
interest of a trust or unincor-
porated association that is
an employer or employee organi-
zation described in C or D.
F. A spouse, ancestor, lineal Same
descendant, or spouse of a
lineal descendant of anyone
described in A, B, C, or E
above.
G. A corporation, partnership, Same
trust or estate, if an inter-
est therein is owned by a
person described in A through
E and such interest represents
directly or indirectly fifty per-
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cent or more of i) the stock of
any such corporation (either
voting stock or total stock
value), (ii) the capital or
profits interest of any such
partnership, or (iii) the
beneficial interest of any
such estate or trust.
H. Any employee, director, or
officer of a person described
in B through G.
I. Any ten percent or more (direct
or indirect) shareholder of a
person described in B
through G.
J. Any partner or joint venture
(with a ten percent or greater
profits or capital interest)
of a person described in B
through G above.
Any officer or director
(not employee) of a per-
son described in C through
G above and any employee
who receives ten percent
or more of the wages paid
by the employer. Note that
officers, directors, and
employees of a person pro-
viding services are parties
in interest but are not
disqualified persons.
Same, but excluding any
shareholder of a person
described in B.
Same, but excluding any
partner or joint venture
or a person described in
B above.
The complexity and breadth of the definitions of fiduciary,
party in interest, and disqualified person open a broad range of new
responsibilities and opportunities for persons working in the pension
industry. Caution must be undertaken at the outset, however, to
insure that each person is aware of his position within the defini-
tional framework.
IV. WHAT ARE THE FmuciARY DUTIES?
ERISA basically imposes upon a fiduciary four general stan-
dards of conduct and provides numerous specific transactions in
which the fiduciary must not engage. Counterbalancing these duties
[Vol. 30:1
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and prohibitions are certain statutory exemptions and a provision
for administrative exemptions.
A. The Exclusive Benefit Rule
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the single standard applica-
ble to the pension trustee was contained in section 401 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. This section provides that a trust shall be estab-
lished and operated for the exclusive benefit of the participant. The
provision was coupled with the prohibited transaction rules of sec-
tion 503 of the Internal Revenue Code to form a general exclusive
benefit ruleY Section 503 of the Code prohibits certain transactions
between a plan and the creator of the trust or a person who controls
the creator of the trust.2 The prohibited transactions, however, were
limited to those in which the plan did not receive adequate consider-
ation. Thus, sales, exchanges, leases, and other transactions be-
tween the plan and its creator or a person controlling its creator were
not prohibited if the plan received adequate consideration. These
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (both those contained in
section 401 and those contained in section 503) have been retained.
In addition, section 404 of ERISA adopts a new exclusive benefit
rule that states that a fiduciary shall discharge his duties in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive
purposes of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries
and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. There
is some question about the interpretation of the exclusive benefit
rule as it relates to section 404 of ERISA. The Conference Commit-
tee Report indicates that if a fiduciary meets the prudency require-
ments of section 404, he will be deemed also to have met the exclu-
sive benefit requirements of section 404 and of section 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 21 One commentator indicates that the
Labor Department probably will take the position that the exclusive
benefit rule of section 404(a)(1) is a "statutory embodiment of the
common law duty of loyalty."3 To those in fiduciary positions, this
would broaden the loyalty requirement generally applicable to trus-
tees. The commentator points out, however, that this construction
would be duplicative in view of the provisions of section 406(b) .31 It
27. I.R.C. § 503.
28. Id. § 503(b).
29. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 302.
30. Lamon, Professional Money Managers: Fiduciary Responsibilitity Under ERISA, 11
REAL PRoP. PROB. & TR. J. 519, 528-29 (1976).
31. Id. at 529.
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seems that the best construction of the exclusive benefit rule con-
tained in section 404 is found in the regulatory treatment given to
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. Perhaps regulations will
clarify this problem.
B. The Prudent Man Rule
Section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA creates a statutory prudent man
rule. A fiduciary will act:
[w]ith the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims .... 32
The Conference Committee Report indicates that the courts should
interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards)
"bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee bene-
fit plans." 33 Much has been written concerning whether this statu-
tory language creates a "prudent expert rule. '34 It has been argued
forcefully that the language "familiar with such matters" places an
additional burden upon a fiduciary to exercise the same skill and
care that an expert in the area of pensions would exercise.35 While
the Conference Committee Report and the House and Senate Com-
mittee Reports on the bills that initially became ERISA do not shed
light on congressional intent concerning the prudent man rule, some
insight may be gained from a review of the legislative history of
House Bill 16462, introduced in 1970.36 In an excellent article, Mor-
ton Klevan points out that a considerable dispute arose concerning
the "prudent expert rule," and the particular standard of conduct
that it described.3 1 Secretary of Labor George Schultz and others
representing the administration at the hearings indicated that the
reason for the change from the common law rule was to create flexi-
bility in order that a distinction could be maintained in judging
those administering small plans with a very limited portfolio and
32. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V. 1975).
33. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 302.
34. See, e.g., Klevan, Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA's Prudent Man Rule:
What are the Guideposts?, 44 J. TAX. 152 (1976); Lamon, supra note 30; Sanchez, Cain, &
Wood, The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Fiduciary Responsibility and Prohibited
Transactions, 6 TAX ADVISER 86 (1975); Sporn, Working with the New Rules of Fiduciary
Responsibility in the 1974 Pension Reform Act, 41 J. TAX. 263 (1974).
35. Sanchez, Cain, & Wood, supra note 34, at 91-92.
36. See Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045, 1046 &
16462 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-70).
37. Klevan, supra note 34, at 152.
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those managing larger plans with enormous assets. As Mr. Klevan
points out, the congressional history of this earlier bill appears to
create a dual standard. On the one hand, larger plans would be
judged by a stricter standard and would require a more professional
approach to investment management.18 On the other hand, small
plans would be judged by a less strict standard. This interpretation
easily can be read into the Act in the terms "conduct of an enter-
prise of a like character and with like aims." 9
The language quoted above, however, raises additional ques-
tions about the prudent man standard in the management of pen-
sion trusts. Is the fiduciary standard different for those managing
defined benefit pension plans as opposed to those managing defined
contribution pension plans? May a fiduciary take greater risk in a
defined benefit plan with the knowledge that an employer must
make up any funding deficiencies in subsequent years and that the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) stands ready with
pension insurance? Should a fiduciary of a defined contribution
plan retreat to a conservative approach since the participants will
bear all losses directly? Neither of these two extremes would seem
to be a prudent approach. While the availability of PBGC insurance
and a solid employer sponsor are circumstances to be considered by
the investment advisors and fiduciaries in determining the funding
and investment policies of the plan, prudence demands that some-
thing short of reckless abandon be adopted as an investment policy.
Likewise, fiduciaries of defined contribution plans may consider
that investment losses impact immediately and directly upon the
participants in determining investment policies; at the same time,
however, they must be aware of possible inflation losses if the guar-
anteed returns achieved through an ultraconservative investment
policy fail to keep stride with a racing inflation.
While basic trust law concepts relating to the prudent man rule
will form a starting point from which a federal common law may be
built, it will be some time before regulations, rulings, and decisions
provide a clear picture of the new prudence standard. 0 In the mean-
time, fiduciaries and investment advisors and those rendering coun-
sel to them must make educated decisions concerning the invest-
ment policies to be followed.
38. Id. at 153.
39. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V. 1975).
40. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
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C. Diversification
Section 404(a) (1) (C) requires a fiduciary to diversify the invest-
ments of the plan in order "to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
so. . . ." Several potential problems are raised by the diversifica-
tion standard.
The first question is the interpretation to be given to the last
phrase of the provision. Is this intended to impose a stricter stand-
ard of diversification? The Conference Committee Report indicates
that the purpose for the clause is to establish who will have the
burden of proof with regard to diversification. The Report points out
that a plaintiff initially would have the burden to prove there has
been a failure to diversify. The defendant then would have the bur-
den to demonstrate that a failure to diversify was prudent under the
circumstances."
A second problem in interpreting the diversification rule is the
extent of diversification required. The Conference Committee Re-
port recognizes that no particular formula or percentages can be
stated.12 Therefore the decision about proper diversification ulti-
mately may be a judicial decision. Certain considerations are impor-
tant in making such a determination: (1) the purposes of the plan;
(2) the amount of the plan assets; (3) financial and industrial condi-
tions; (4) the type of investment, whether mortgages, bonds, or
shares of stock or otherwise; (5) distribution concerning geographi-
cal location; (6) distribution concerning industries; and (7) dates of
maturity. 3 Applying these considerations may lead one to question
whether the diversification rules require diversification among dif-
ferent kinds of investments or diversification within one class of
investments. For example, do the diversification rules require in-
vestments in stock, real estate, mortgages, and other types of invest-
ments? Within a classification such as stock, does the rule require
further diversification? It would appear that diversification among
various types of investments may not be required if sufficient diver-
sity may be obtained within a classification. For example, invest-
ment of 100 percent of the fund's assets in common stock apparently
would not be considered a failure to diversify so long as within the
classification different industries and different types of stock
(growth versus income) were represented.4 On the other hand, a 100
41. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 304.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 305.
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percent investment in real estate or mortgages might be a failure to
diversify if contrary to the needs of the plan for liquidity.
A similar problem arises in the case of investments in mutual
funds or pooled income fund trusts. The Conference Committee
Report makes it clear that in the case of mutual funds and pooled
or common trust funds, the diversification requirement may be met
by looking to the underlying assets. A 100 percent investment in
mutual funds would not violate necessarily the diversification rules
so long as the mutual fund itself was diversified in investments."
The same is true for common or pooled income funds.
D. Compliance with Plan Documents
The fourth requirement of section 404(a)(1) is that the fiduciary
comply with the provisions of plan documents to the extent that
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of ERISA. As will be
noted in the review of the prohibited transaction rules and their
related exemptions, repeated reference is made to the need for com-
pliance with the terms of the plan. This requirement has both an
affirmative and a negative aspect. On the affirmative side, the fidu-
ciary is directed to act within the terms of the plan as they exist.
From the negative aspect, the fiduciary may not take actions for
which no provision is made in the plan. As will be noted, certain
exemptions from the prohibited transaction rules require a specific
plan provision in order for the exemption to apply.
E. The Prohibited Transaction Rules
Both the Labor title (section 406) and the Treasury title (sec-
tion 4975) contain a listing of certain prohibited transactions. The
prohibited transactions are similar with two exceptions. Section
406(a)(1)(E) prohibits the acquisition on behalf of the plan of any
employer security or employer real property in violation of section
407(a). No similar prohibition is found in section 4975, although
section 4975(c)(1)(a) probably covers such a transaction. Secondly,
section 406(b)(2) prohibits a fiduciary from acting in a transaction
involving the plan if the fiduciary acts on behalf of or represents a
party whose interests are adverse to the plan or its participants or
beneficiaries. Again no similar provision is found in section 4975.
With these exceptions, the provisions of the two sections are similar
with one further caveat. Section 406 involves dealings between a
fiduciary and a party in interest, but section 4975 involves transac-
45. Id.
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tions between a plan and a disqualified person. As noted above, a
slight difference exists in the definitions of disqualified persons and
party in interest that results in slightly different applications of
these two sections. For purposes of the discussion below, the terms
disqualified persons and party in interest will be presumed to be
interchangeable except as noted.
(1) Sale, Exchange, or Lease of Property
A sale, exchange, or lease of any property between a plan and
a party in interest constitutes a prohibited transaction." With re-
gard to the leasing of property between a plan and a party in inter-
est, section 408(b) (2) provides a limited exemption. Under that sec-
tion, contracting or making reasonable arrangements with a party
in interest for office space necessary for the establishment or opera-
tion of the plan is not a prohibited transaction if no more than
reasonable compensation is paid. Proposed Labor Regulation
2550.408b-2(b) provides that a service is necessary for the establish-
ment or operation of the plan if it is of a type customarily furnished
to plans of the kind in question in the ordinary course of their
establishment or operation. In determining what is a reasonable
contract or arrangement, the regulations state that the contract
must permit the plan to terminate without penalty on a reasonably
short notice. 7 For example, a long-term office lease will not be un-
reasonable merely because of its long term if it provides that the
plan may terminate without penalty on short notice under the cir-
cumstances. A one-year notice period would be reasonable for termi-
nating a twenty-year lease.48 Reasonable compensation is defined as
compensation reasonable under the facts and circumstances, a
clearly unhelpful definition.49 Significantly, the exemption allowing
the leasing of office space provides an exemption from the provisions
of 406(a)(1)(A), (C), or (D). No exemption, however, is provided
with regard to section 406(b). Thus one who is a fiduciary with
respect to the plan may not provide office space and receive consid-
eration for it unless such a provision is arranged and approved on
behalf of the plan by a fiduciary who is independent of and unre-
lated to the fiduciary providing the services."
46. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975); id. § 2003(a),
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A).
47. 41 Fed. Reg. 31,875-76 (1976).
48. Id. at 31,876.
49. Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-2(b)(4), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,876 (1976). See also
Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.408c-2, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,877 (1976).
50. Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-2(b)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,875-76 (1976).
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Another possible exemption with regard to the leasing of prop-
erty is the exemption allowed for qualifying employer real property
under section 407 of ERISA. The definition of qualifying employer
real property is limited to a substantial number of parcels geograph-
ically dispersed.5' Therefore this exemption would not be available
for most employers. In fact, this exemption has been referred to as
the "7-11 exemption," since generally it is applicable to the conveni-
ence store industry.
Several exemptions from the general prohibition against the
sale or exchange of property between a plan and a party in interest
are available. Section 407 provides a complete exemption for the
purchase of qualifying employer real property or qualifying em-
ployer securities from an eligible individual account plan and a
limited exemption for other plans. An eligible individual account
plan (a profit-sharing, stock-bonus, thrift or savings plan, employee
stock ownership plan, or money purchase plan in existence on
September 2, 1974 that at the time invested primarily in employer
securities) may purchase qualifying employer securities or qualify-
ing employer real property.5 2 Qualifying employer securities are
stock or marketable obligations of the employer.53 Qualifying em-
ployer real property is real property (and related personal property)
that is leased to the employer whose employees are covered by a
plan or to an affiliate of such an employer and consists of a substan-
tial number of parcels that are geographically dispersed and suita-
ble for more than one use. 4
All other plans are subject to a limitation on the acquisition or
holding of qualifying employer securities or qualifying employer real
property.55 The limitation is expressed as ten percent of the fair
market value of the assets of the plan. Transitional rules are pro-
vided for plans to comply with this ruling with the requirements to
be effective fully in 1985.11
Two other possible exemptions have application to the sales or
transfer rules. The first is the blind sale.5 7 A "blind transaction" is
a purchase or sale of securities through an exchange in which neither
the buyer nor the seller (nor their agents) knows the identity of the
other party involved. In this instance, the Committee found no rea-
51. ERISA § 407(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
52. Id. § 407(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b) (Supp. V 1975).
53. Id. § 407(d)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(5) (Supp. Y 1975).
54. Id. § 407(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
55. Id. § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
56. Id. § 407(a)(3)-(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. V 1975).
57. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 307.
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son to impose a sanction merely because the other party turned out
to be a party in interest. Pursuant to its authority to grant adminis-
trative exemptions, 8 the Labor Department issued Prohibited
Transaction Exemption 75-1, which provides an exemption to
broker-dealers involved in principal transactions, underwritings,
and market making.59
(2) Loans and Extensions of Credit
Section 406(a)(1)(B) of ERISA prohibits a fiduciary from par-
ticipating in the lending of money or other extension of credit be-
tween the plan and a party in interest. The Conference Committee
Report indicates that the extensions of credit and loan provisions
apply to such transactions as an employer's funding his contribution
for a particular year with a debt obligation or the acquisition by the
plan of a debt instrument that is an obligation of a party in inter-
est." Clearly covered by this prohibition is the guaranteeing of loans
by parties in interest.
There are two basic statutory exemptions to this prohibition.
Section 408(b)(1) provides that loans from a plan to a party in
interest who is a participant or beneficiary of a plan will not be
considered a prohibited transaction if certain requirements are met.
The loans must bear a reasonable rate of interest and must be paid
pursuant to specific provisions of the plan authorizing such loans.
The loans must be secured adequately. The loans may be secured
by a first mortgage or the vested interest of the participant in the
plan.' Section 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code indicates
that such collateral will not constitute an alienation of the partici-
pant's benefit that would disqualify the plan under the provisions
of section 401(a) of the Code. Loans to participants also must be
available to all participants and beneficiaries on a reasonably equiv-
alent basis and not made available to highly compensated employ-
ees, officers, or shareholders in an amount greater than the amount
made available to the other employees.2 Therefore, the plan may
not discriminate between applicants on the basis of age or sex, and
may not establish various amounts for loans depending on whether
a person was an officer, supervisor, or director. Nevertheless, the
plan can establish requirements for creditworthiness and collat-
58. ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (Supp. V 1975).
59. 40 Fed. Reg. 50,845 (1975).
60. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 308.
61. Id. at 311-12.
62. Id.
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eral.13 The Conference Committee Report indicates that the confer-
ees intended that the plan could lend the same percentage of a
person's vested benefit to participants with both large and small
amounts of accrued vested benefits. 4 The plan also could loan a
specified amount to all participants regardless of the amount of
vested benefit. For example, the plan could provide for loans of up
to 30,000 dollars for the purchase of a house, assuming that the other
requirements for reasonable interest and adequate security were
met." Plans also could make such limits for other financial needs,
such as a participant's child's college education or severe financial
needs. While it might be appropriate to provide that the plan would
loan money to participants up to 10,000 dollars for the purchase of
an automobile, the administrative problems attendant with numer-
ous loans of this nature probably would be prohibitive.
Another statutory exemption to the prohibited transaction
rules with regard to loans or extensions of credit is found in section
408(b)(3), which concerns loans to an employee stock ownership
plan (ESOP).6 The exemption indicates that so long as a loan is
primarily for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries and has a
reasonable rate of interest, an exemption will be granted from the
prohibited transaction rules. This section also indicates that collat-
eral, if any, must consist only of employer securities. Numerous
developments in this particular area have occurred. The Conference
Committee Report indicates that this exemption is intended to
cover not only the extension of credit in the form of a loan, but also
the guarantee of the loan by a party in interest. Further, Congress
recognized a specific transaction commonly used by an ESOP, in
which the plan purchases stock under the installment method from
a shareholder who is a party in interest, issuing a note for the pur-
chase price. This method has been authorized and utilized in order
to provide the shareholder with a market for his securities on the
installment method without having to run the gauntlet of sections
301 and 302 of the Internal Revenue Code with regard to dividends. 7
The exclusive benefit rule is applicable to these transactions. There-
fore the Department of Labor and the courts might be expected to
take a strict view of the use of employee plans for these purposes.
63. Id. at 311.
64. Id. at 312.
65. Id.
66. ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
67. But see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1, which provides that § 301 of the Internal
Revenue Code may apply to such a transaction. 41 Fed. Reg. 31,834 (1976).
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Finally, the Conference Committee Report makes it clear that Con-
gress intends the loan provisions to be utilized only for the purchase
of employer securities and for no other purpose.18
On November 4, 1975, the Internal Revenue Service issued
Technical Information Release 1413, which provides questions and
answers relating to employee stock ownership plans. Question F-10
of the Technical Information Release provides guidelines for re-
quired plan provisions when an ESOP is allowed to borrow funds.
In addition to the requirements that the loan must be at a reason-
able rate of interest and that collateral may consist only of assets
purchased with the borrowed funds, the answer indicates that the
creditor should have no recourse against the trust except with re-
spect to the collateral and that the collateral should be released pro
rata as the loan is amortized. Further, the loan must be repaid only
from amounts contributed and earnings on trust investments. Fi-
nally, the answer indicates that the employer must contribute
amounts sufficient to amortize the debt even though the contribu-
tions yield no tax benefit. 9
On July 30, 1976, the Internal Revenue Service published pro-
posed regulations concerning loans to employee stock ownership
plans.70 On the same day, the Labor Department issued proposed
regulations dealing with the same subject.7 The proposed regula-
tions issued are similar, providing that the loan proceeds must be
used for the acquisition of employer securities or to repay such
loans.72 Except for certain limitations, all stock acquired pursuant
to the loan must be common stock with voting privileges and unre-
stricted dividend rights. In this regard, the regulations provide three
tests to establish whether the stock is common voting stock. 73 If
nonvoting common stock or preferred stock is acquired, immedi-
ately following the purchase no more than twenty-five percent of the
aggregate amount of the securities issued and outstanding at the
time of the purchase may be held by the ESOP and at least fifty
percent of the aggregate amount of the issue must be held by per-
sons independent of the issuer .7 No more than twenty-five percent
68. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 313.
69. Normally a lender would require such a provision in the loan documents.
70. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,834 (1976).
71. Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,871 (1976).
72. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(i)(B), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,834 (1976); Proposed
Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(ii)(A), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,871 (1976).
73. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(i)(B)(2), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,834 (1976); Pro-
posed Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(ii)(B), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,872 (1976).
74. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(3), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,835 (1976); Proposed Labor
Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(ii)(C), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,872 (1976).
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of ESOP assets can be invested in employer securities other than
common voting stock." If the stock acquired is not listed on a na-
tional exchange, it must be subject to an option to sell to the em-
ployer exercisable by the participants or their beneficiaries during
a two-year period, beginning on the date the employer securities
are distributed to the participant or beneficiary. The amount of the
put option is the fair market value-of the security as of the date of
the exercise. Payment of the price shall be in cash within a reason-
able time."
The regulations expand upon the statutory provision regarding
the use of collateral and make it clear that no recourse shall be
allowed against the ESOP other than the collateral pledged. 7  The
regulations further provide for the creation and maintenance of a
suspense account to hold the securities pledged as collateral for the
loan.7" Finally, the regulations provide that the voting rights attend-
ant to the common stock must be exercisable by the participants
with regard to stock allocated to their vested account. 7
In addition to the strict requirements concerning the loan, the
proposed regulations adopt an independent third-party approval
rule for loans to the ESOP by fiduciaries. The regulations indicate
that if a trustee of the ESOP is also the lender, a prohibited transac-
tion occurs unless the loan is arranged and approved on behalf of
the plan by a fiduciary who is independent of and unrelated to the
lending trustee.," Similarly, the regulations take the position that if
a loan is guaranteed by the employer sponsoring the plan, a pro-
hibited transaction not covered by the statutory exemption has oc-
curred since a fiduciary has guaranteed the loan. The regulations
point out that a prohibited transaction could be avoided in this
situation if the guarantee was arranged by an independent party."'
The proposed regulations dealing with loans and guarantees of
loans to ESOPs have the effect of removing the ESOP as a viable
pension plan alternative. The requirements for voting stock and
75. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(5), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,835 (1976); Proposed Labor
Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(ii)(E), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,872 (1976).
76. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(6), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,835 (1976); Proposed Labor
Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(ii)(F), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,872 (1976).
77. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(i)(C), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,835 (1976); Proposed
Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(1)(iii), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,872 (1976).
78. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2) (iii), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,835 (1976); Proposed
Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(b)(3), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,872 (1976).
79. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11(d)(2), 41 Fef. Reg. 31,837 (1976).
80. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(1)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,834 (1976); Proposed
Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-3(a)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,871 (1976).
81. Proposed Treas. Reg. §54.4975-7(b)(1)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,834 (1976).
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pass-through voting rights (similar to those required for a TRASOP
under the Tax Reduction Act of 1975) and the third-party approval
requirements for loans by trustees and guarantees by fiduciaries
appear to be unreasonable, impractical, and contrary to congres-
sional intent in establishing and encouraging the ESOP program.
Congress recognized these facts in the Conference Report accompa-
nying the Tax Reform Act of 1976.82 In an almost unprecedented
manner, Congress specifically addressed itself to proposed regula-
tions issued by the Labor Department and the Treasury Depart-
ment. The Committee Report states that the regulations "may
make it virtually impossible for ESOPs, and especially leveraged
ESOPs, to be established and function effectively. 8 3 First, the
Committee found the third-party approval requirement with regard
to loans by plan trustees to be "unduly burdensome." The conferees
state that the regulations should deal directly with abuses that may
occur rather than attempting to require a plan to incur the burden
of dealing through an independent third party. The Committee also
states that no third-party approval should be required for the sale
of employer stock between the employer or a shareholder of the
employer and the ESOP. Secondly, the Committee indicates that
the basic concept of the put option is consistent with Congress's
desire to provide a market for the securities; the Committee, how-
ever, urges a put option period of substantially less than two years
and further recommends that the payment period be spread over a
longer period of time so that an undue cash flow burden will not be
placed upon the plan. With regard to the pass-through of voting
rights, the Committee concludes that "the regulations should not
distinguish between leveraged ESOPs and other employee plans in
this regard.", 4 It is not clear from the Committee's approach
whether it recommends that no pass-through voting should be re-
quired in the ESOP or other plans or whether the Committee states
that a rule of uniformity should prevail. If the latter is the case,
Congress and the Treasury may take the position that pass-through
voting is appropriate, especially since Congress already has taken
this position with regard to investment tax credit ESOPs (TRA-
SOPs) under the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.85 Similarly, the Com-
mittee believes that the restrictions that place a limitation on the
amount of nonvoting stock that may be acquired by the plan are
82. H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 539 (1976).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 540.
85. Pub. L. No. 94-12 § 301(d), 89 Stat. 38 (1975), I.R.C. § 46, note.
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inappropriate. Finally, the Committee indicates that the prohibi-
tion against a right of first refusal on stock purchased through a
leveraged ESOP is not consistent with practicalities of corporate
life. Therefore the Committee stated that the prohibition "will have
a chilling effect upon the establishment of ESOPs and should not
be prescribed."86
District offices of the Internal Revenue Service currently are
acting on requests for determination letters for ESOPs without re-
gard to the provisions of the proposed regulations. New regulations
apparently will be issued; hopefully, the new regulations will be
consistent with the recommendations of Congress. If this is not the
case, litigation is almost a certainty.
(3) Furnishing of Goods, Services, and Facilities
The next prohibited transaction involves the furnishing of
goods, services, or facilities between a plan and a party in interest. 7
Section 408(b)(2) provides that this prohibition shall not apply to a
contract or reasonable arrangement for office space, legal, account-
ing, or other services necessary for the establishment or operation
of the plan, if no more than reasonable compensation is paid. The
proposed rules relating to this exemption are similar to those pro-
vided for the leasing of office space to or from a party in interest."
Two other statutory exemptions are available in the area of
services. First, section 408(c)(2) provides that a fiduciary may re-
ceive reasonable compensation for services rendered or expenses
incurred in the performance of his duties. An exception to this rule
involves persons receiving full-time pay from the employer sponsor
or an association of employers whose employees are participants in
the plan. In the case of these individuals no compensation may be
received; expenses incurred in the performance of their duties, how-
ever, may be recovered. 9 Proposed Labor Regulation § 2550.408c-
2(b)(3) provides that reimbursement for expenses may be in the
form of an advance provided that the amount of the advance is
reasonable with regard to the amount of expense likely to be in-
curred, and the fiduciary accounts to the plan for expenses."0 A
second statutory exemption is section 408(c) (3), which provides that
86. H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 541 (1976).
87. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975); id. § 2003(a),
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(C).
88. Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-2(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,875 (1976).
89. ERISA § 408(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975); id. § 2003(a), I.R.C. §
4975(d)(10).
90. Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.408c-2(b)(3), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,877 (1976).
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a fiduciary may serve in such capacity in addition to being an offi-
cer, employee, agent, or other representative of a party in interest.
As noted above, section 408(b)(2) only provides an exemption
with respect to the prohibited transactions rules involving parties
in interest and disqualified persons. The exemption does not cover
the so-called "multiple services" problems of a fiduciary. For exam-
ple, the exemption does not cover the receipt of commissions by an
insurance agent who is also a fiduciary because he renders invest-
ment advice. A possible solution is the anti-self-selection procedure
authorized by the proposed regulations, under which such self-
dealing is exempt from the prohibited transactions provisions if the
services are arranged through an independent third party.'" This
presents a particular problem for small plans that rely upon an
insurance salesman for total pension advice. 2 The preamble to both
the Treasury and Labor proposed regulations indicate the existence
of pending requests for class exemptions with regard to the problem
involving the receipt of insurance commissions by persons deemed
to be fiduciaries of plans. 3
(4) Transfers of Plan Assets
Section 406(a)(1)(D) prohibits a fiduciary from transferring
assets of the plan to or for the use or benefit of a party in interest.
Statutory exemptions are found in the following provisions: section
408(b)(7), which covers the exercise of privileges for conversions of
securities; section 408(b)(9), dealing with distributions of plan as-
sets in accordance with the terms of the plan; and section 408(c)(1),
concerning the receipt of benefits by a participant who is a party in
interest. The Conference Committee Report notes that since a plan
legally can acquire and hold employer securities that may be con-
vertible in nature, the plan to convert the securities will not be a
prohibited transaction so long as fair market value is received."
Similarly, the distribution of plan assets or benefits in accordance
with the terms of the plan will not be prohibited transactions. This
might include a return of contributions or assets to the employer
under certain conditions,95 as well as the normal payment of benefits
to a party in interest who is also a plan participant or beneficiary.
91. Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-2(b)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,875 (1976).
92. Lamon, supra note 30, at 543.
93. 41 Fed. Reg. 31,839, 31,875 (1976).
94. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 315.
95. ERISA §§ 408(b)(9), 408(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1108(b)(9), 1108(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975);
ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(9); see ERISA § 403(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (Supp. V
1975), regarding the return of employer contributions in certain situations.
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A particular problem has arisen in the case of life insurance policy
transfers. This problem will be discussed in detail below. 6
(5) Acquisition of Employer Securities and Employer
Real Property
Section 406(a)(1)(E) prohibits the acquisition of employer se-
curities or employer real property in violation of section 407. The
terms of section 407 have been discussed previously with regard to
the sale or exchange of assets."
(6) The Self-Dealing Provisions
Section 406(b) contains three provisions that address self-
dealing by the fiduciary. The first provisions prohibits a fiduciary
from dealing with plan assets in the fiduciary's own interest.9" The
Conference Committee Report indicates that this prohibition does
not prevent a fiduciary participant from managing the trust fund
in which he has a personal account. The second prohibition in-
volves the receipt of consideration in connection with a transaction
involving plan assets. 0 ° This is basically a kick-back provision. Fi-
nally, a provision included only in the Labor title prohibits the
fiduciary from acting in a transaction involving the plan if the fidu-
ciary is acting on behalf of a person whose interests are adverse to
the plan participants.'"' The Conference Committee Report indi-
cates that it is not included in the Treasury title because of the
difficulty that would arise in determining the amount subject to the
excise tax.' °2 The provision obviously is designed to prevent a
fiduciary from being placed in a situation involving dual loyalties.
Arguably, this provision duplicates the exclusive benefit rule appli-
cable to both the Labor and Treasury titles.
(7) The Banking Provisions
Three provisions of section 408 specifically involve the banking
industry. Section 408(b)(8) allows the plan to enter transactions
with a common trust fund or pooled income fund maintained by a
party in interest which is a bank or a trust company so long as the
96. See notes 131 & 132 infra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
98. ERISA § 406(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
99. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 309.
100. ERISA § 406(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
101. Id. § 406(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
102. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 309.
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following conditions are met: (1) the transaction is a sale or pur-
chase in the interest in the fund; (2) the bank receives only reason-
able compensation; and (3) the transaction is permitted expressly
by the terms of the trust instrument or by an independent fiduciary.
Most banks that act as trustees and wish to have the authority to
invest plan assets in their common trust fund or pooled income fund
have a specific plan provision that will be incorporated into the plan
specifically authorizing such investments. 13
A second banking provision is section 408(b)(4), which allows
for the investment of all or a portion of the plan assets in interest-
bearing deposits with a bank if (1) the plan covers only bank em-
ployees (or affiliate employees) or (2) the investment is authorized
expressly by the plan or by a fiduciary other than the bank who is
authorized specifically in the plan to do so.
The final banking provision covers ancillary services, including
non-interest-bearing checking accounts. Section 408(b)(6) indicates
that the exemption is granted largely because of the safeguards
provided in the form of federal and state supervisory authorities.
The proposed regulations point out that assets held by a fiduciary
bank that are needed to satisfy current plan expenses may be placed
by the fiduciary in a non-interest-bearing checking account in the
bank without constituting a prohibited transaction. 4 The Confer-
ence Committee Report states, however, that because of the availa-
bility of numerous short term investment vehicles, only minimal
amounts may be placed in such non-interest-bearing checking ac-
counts. 15 The powers granted by this exemption should be exercised
in a cautious manner by fiduciary banks.
(8) Life Insurance Provisions
Pooled investment funds maintained by life insurance compa-
nies receive the same exemption from the prohibited transaction
103. The following provision is suggested by Commerce Union Bank of Nashville, Ten-
nessee:
The Declaration of Trust executed by Commerce Union Bank on the first day of Septem-
ber 1967, as amended from time to time, is hereby made a part of this Agreement.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the person hereunder, may
cause any part or all of such assets to be co-mingled with the assets of any other trust
by investment as a part of the Group Trust created by said Declaration of Trust, and hs
a part of any one or more of the Funds into which the Group Trust may from time to
time be divided, and the assets so invested shall be subject to all of the provisions of
said Declaration of Trust as it may be amended from time to time.
104. Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.408b-6(a), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,876-77 (1976).
105. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 315.
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rules as the common trust fund of a bank.' 6 In addition, section
408(b)(5) allows the fiduciary to purchase life insurance contracts
from the employer maintaining the plan or a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of the employer maintaining the plan under certain condi-
tions.' 7 The Conference Committee Report explains that it would
be outside the normal business context to expect a life insurance
company maintaining a pension plan to obtain insurance for its
participants from a competitor. 108 Of course, the general rules of
reasonable compensation would apply.
F. Administrative Exemptions
In addition to the statutory exemptions, section 408 provides
for the granting of administrative exemptions by the Secretary of
Labor.' 9 Not only must the exemption be administratively feasible,
but it also must protect the interests of participants and beneficiar-
ies. The Secretary of Labor is required to consult with the Secretary
of Treasury and publish the proposed exemption in the Federal
Register prior to granting it.
V. SANCTIONS
ERISA provides several forms of civil penalties and criminal
sanctions, including an excise tax, which are intended to prevent
violations of fiduciary duties. The Act further contains several com-
plex rules relating to cofiduciary and cotrustee liability.
A. Civil Penalties
ERISA allows civil actions by participants, beneficiaries, fidu-
ciaries, and the Secretary of Labor."0 Section 409 of ERISA provides
that a fiduciary who breaches any of his responsibilities or duties is
liable personally to restore any losses to the plan or profits made
from the use of plan assets as a result of such breach. The fiduciary
also is subject to any other equitable remedy that a court deems
appropriate, including removal. Such an action may be brought by
the Secretary of Labor, a participant, beneficiary, or another fidu-
106. ERISA § 408(b)(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(8) (Supp. V 1975); id. § 2003(a), I.R.C. §
4975(d)(8).
107. Total premiums and annuity consideration paid for all plans (except those re-
ceived by the employer maintaining the plan) must not exceed 5% of total premiums and
consideration received for all lines of insurance in such year by the affiliate. ERISA §
408(b)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
108. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 314.
109. ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (Supp. V 1975).
110. Id. § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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ciary.' In addition, a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil
action to recover any benefits due to him, to enforce any rights that
the beneficiary or participant may have under the plan, or to clarify
any future benefits."2 A participant or beneficiary also may bring
an action against an administrator under section 502(c) of ERISA
if the administrator refuses or fails to comply with a request for
disclosure of certain material to which participants and beneficiar-
ies have access."13 The penalty for a failure to disclose may be an
amount of up to one hundred dollars per day from the date the
administrator refused to make the disclosure, plus such other relief
as the court deems appropriate.
Civil actions may be brought by participants or beneficiaries to
enjoin violation of any provision of Title I of the Act or any provision
of the plan."' Injunctive relief may be sought to redress a violation
of Title I or to enforce any of Title I's provisions. Further, such an
action also may be brought by the Secretary of Labor if requested
by the Secretary of Treasury or one or more of the participants,
beneficiaries, or fiduciaries of the plan. 15 Finally, the Secretary of
Labor may bring a civil action to collect the civil penalty provided
in section 502(i) of ERISA."6 This penalty is similar to the excise
tax described below and is applicable only to those plans covered
by Title I that are not covered by the Treasury title.
ERISA adopts several procedural rules concerning the actions
allowed by Title I. First, exclusive jurisdiction is given to federal
district courts except in the case of actions brought under section
502(a)(1) (B), which relate to suits by a participant or beneficiary for
the recovery of benefits or to establish future benefits."7 An action
under Title I may be initiated properly in the district where the plan
is administered, where the breach of fiduciary duty occurred, or
where the defendant resides or may be found. Secondly, service of
process may be made nationwide."' Section 502(h) requires that a
copy of the complaint in any action (except those for recovery of
benefits) shall be served upon both the Secretary of Labor and the
Secretary of the Treasury. Finally, section 502(g) provides that the
court may allow reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action
111. Id. § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
112. Id. §§ 502(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. 99 1132(a)(1), (3) (Supp. V 1975).
113. Id. § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (Supp. V 1975).
114. Id. § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
115. Id. § 502(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (Supp. V 1975).
116. Id. § 502(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(6) (Supp. V 1975).
117. Id. § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
118. Id. § 502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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to either party. This provision is designed to make counsel available
to participants or beneficiaries and to provide protection to fiduciar-
ies involved in frivolous actions.
Civil actions must be brought before the earlier of the following
occurrences: (1) six years after the breach occurs or the date when
the fiduciary could have cured any omission; or (2) three years after
the date upon which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
breach or the date on which he could have obtained such knowledge
from a report filed with the Secretary of Labor. In the case of an
action for fraud or concealment, the action may be commenced
within six years of the date of discovery of the breach."'
In addition to the strong liability provisions and the liberal
rules for the institution of actions, ERISA prohibits a plan from
containing a provision that purports to relieve a fiduciary of any of
his liabilities or responsibilities."" The plan can purchase insurance
to protect itself against losses arising as a result of an act or omission
by the fiduciary, provided that the policy allows the insurer to have
recourse against the fiduciary.121 Similarly, a fiduciary might pur-
chase insurance on his own account.2 2 Finally, an employer or em-
ployee organization may provide insurance without recourse for fi-
duciaries.'1 One question that might be considered is whether the
purchase of insurance by an employer-sponsor to protect a fiduciary
against losses related to a breach of his fiduciary duty are tax de-
ductible by the employer. It is likely that the expense would be
treated as an ordinary and necessary business expense, since ERISA
specifically provides for the purchase of such insurance and the
provision for insurance may be necessary in order to obtain the
services of a fiduciary.
In addition to these types of insurance, section 412 of ERISA
requires that every fiduciary be bonded unless the plan provides
benefits from the general assets of the employer or the fiduciary is
a bank or insurance company with combined capital and surplus in
excess of one million dollars. The bond will be an amount equal to
ten percent of the funds handled by the fiduciary, but in no case less
than 1,000 dollars or more than 500,000 dollars. Section 412(c) pro-
vides that it is unlawful to procure the bond from a surety or
through a broker if the plan or any party in interest has control or
a significant financial interest in the surety or broker.
119. Id. § 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. V 1975).
120. Id. § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (Supp. V 1975).
121. Id. § 410(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
122. Id. § 410(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
123. Id. § 410(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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B. Criminal Penalties
Three provisions of ERISA impose criminal liability. Section 501
makes it unlawful for a person to violate wilfully any provision of
the Labor title and provides for a fine of 5,000 dollars and imprison-
ment of one year upon conviction. In the case of a corporate viola-
tion, the fine is not to exceed 100,000 dollars. The actual wording
of section 501 limits the violation to "part I of this subtitle." Part 1
of subtitle B deals with reporting and disclosure. The Conference
Committee Report states that this criminal provision applies to any
person who wilfully violates any provisions of Title I of the bill.,24
Title I of the bill includes the entire labor provision. Therefore, by
its own terms, the criminal provisions of section 501 apparently
apply only to the reporting and disclosure requirements. This seems
to be clearly contrary to the intent of Congress and is a matter that
should be dealt with by regulation or amendment.
Sections 510 and 511 of ERISA apply to interference with rights
protected by ERISA. Section 510 makes it unlawful for any person
to discharge or discipline any participant or beneficiary for exercis-
ing a right to which he is entitled under the provisions of the Act.
This extends to the firing or disciplining of an individual who gives
testimony or information to any inquiry or proceeding related to
ERISA. Section 511, on the other hand, makes it unlawful to use
fraud, force, violence, coercion, or intimidation for the purpose of
interfering with the exercise of a right under ERISA. The civil ac-
tions provided under section 502 are the remedies with regard to
section 510 violations. On the other hand, section 511 provides a
penalty of imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of
10,000 dollars, or both.
C. The Excise Tax
Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes an excise
tax on prohibited transactions. The tax is levied against the disqual-
ified person participating in the prohibited transaction (other than
a fiduciary acting as such). The initial tax is an amount equal to
five percent of the "amount involved" with respect to the prohibited
transaction for each year in the "taxable period."'2 5 Taxable period
is a period beginning with the date on which the prohibited transac-
tion occurs and ending on the earlier of either the date of the mailing
of a notice of deficiency with respect to the tax or the date on which
124. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 326.
125. ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(a).
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the correction of the prohibited transaction is completed.' 26 If a
prohibited transaction is not corrected within the correction period
(a period beginning on the date the prohibited transaction occurs
and ending ninety days after the mailing of the notice of deficiency),
an additional tax is imposed equal to one hundred percent of the
amount involved in the prohibited transaction. 27 The term "correc-
tion" as used in the Act means undoing the transaction to the extent
possible, but in any case placing the plan in a financial position not
worse than that in which it would have been had a disqualified
person acted according to the highest fiduciary standards. 28
The term "amount involved" is defined as the greater of the fair
market value of the property given or the fair market value of the
property received in the transaction; with regard to services ren-
dered, the amount involved relates only to excess compensation
received. 29 With respect to the initial five percent tax, the amount
involved is valued as of the date of the transaction.'30 On the other
hand, with respect to the one hundred percent tax, the amount
involved is the highest value during the correction period. 3' The
Conference Committee Report indicates that this approach is taken
to encourage disqualified persons to make restitution immedi-
ately. 32 Thus, if a disqualified person is involved in a prohibited
transaction involving the purchase or sale of assets with a fair mar-
ket value of 50,000 dollars on the date of the transaction, and during
the correction period the value of the assets increased to 100,000
dollars, but on the date of correction the value decreased to 10,000
dollars, the one hundred percent tax is levied against the 100,000
dollar value. Therefore the disqualified person is in possession of
assets worth 10,000 dollars, but is required to return sufficient assets
to the plan to place the plan in the same position in which it would
have been in the absence of the transaction. Thus an excise tax of
100,000 dollars is paid.
The results to the disqualified person are even more alarming
in view of the statute's determination of what constitutes correction.
The Conference Committee Report indicates that the higher valua-
126. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(f)(2). The Secretary of Labor must have a reasonable opportun-
ity to obtain a correction prior to the notice of deficiency. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(h).
127. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(b).
128. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(f)(5). Pending permanent regulations, § 4941 and the regulations
thereunder are to be utilized in interpreting "taxable period," "amount involved," "correc-
tion," and "corrections period." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 141.4975-13, 41 Fed. Reg. 32,890 (1976).
129. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(f)(4).
130. Id. I.R.C. § 4975(f)(4)(A).
131. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(f)(4)(B).
132. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 322.
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tion used in computing the one hundred percent tax (100,000 dollars
in the example above) is also the amount to be restored to the
plan. 13  Therefore, in the example above, the disqualified person is
in possession of assets with a fair market value of 10,000 dollars, but
is required to restore to the plan 100,000 dollars, and to pay an
excise tax of 100,000 dollars. The higher valuation does not apply
in the case of the initial five percent tax.
D. Liability for Breaches of Duty by Cofiduciaries or Cotrustees
In addition to liability that may arise by virtue of the actions
of a fiduciary, the fiduciary may be liable for breaches of duties by
cofiduciaries. Section 405 of ERISA provides that a fiduciary will be
liable for the acts of a cofiduciary if: (1) he knowingly participates
in or undertakes to conceal an act or omission by a cofiduciary, and
knows such act or omission to have been a breach of fiduciary duty;
(2) he fails to comply with the prudent man, diversification, or
exclusive benefit rules and thus allows another fiduciary to commit
a breach; or (3) he fails to remedy a breach once he gains knowledge
of the breach. 34
In order to violate section 405(a)(1), the fiduciary must know
that the other party is a fiduciary, and that he participated in an
act constituting a breach. If a fiduciary either does not know that
another party is a fiduciary of the plan or does not know that the
actions taken by the person are a breach of fiduciary duty, this
section does not apply. 135 Under section 405(a)(1), a fiduciary may
be liable for the acts of a cofiduciary if the fiduciary fails to exercise
prudence, fails to comply with the diversification rules, or fails to
exercise his duties for the exclusive benefit of the participants and
beneficiaries of the plan. For example, if two fiduciaries are given
joint responsibility for the management of fund assets, and one
fiduciary abdicates all of his decision-making authority to the other
fiduciary, he remains liable for the acts of the cofiduciary since he
has not acted in a prudent fashion in abdicating his responsibility. 136
Finally, if a fiduciary discovers a breach by a cofiduciary, section
405(a) (3) requires the fiduciary to take reasonable actions to remedy
the breach. This may consist of correcting a prohibited transaction
or an imprudent investment, notifying the plan sponsor or the De-
partment of Labor, or initiating court action. Thus one fiduciary
133. Id.
134. ERISA § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (Supp. V 1975).
135. CONFERENCE REPoRT, supra note 11, at 299.
136. Id. at 300.
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may incur a responsibility to bring suit against a cofiduciary for a
breach of fiduciary duty.' 31
Section 405(b) of ERISA requires each trustee of plans in which
the assets are held by cotrustees to use reasonable care to prevent
his cotrustee from breaching any duty. Further, the section states
that the cotrustees have joint authority 4nd responsibility for man-
aging and controlling the assets of the plan unless pursuant to au-
thorization in the plan, there is an allocation of duties, responsibili-
ties, and obligations between the cotrustees.' 3' The trust instrument
should outline the duties that may be allocated and the procedure
to be followed for allocation.'39 The trustee must act prudently in
implementing any allocation procedure. If the allocation is imple-
mented properly, the trustee is liable only for those duties, respon-
silities, and obligations imposed upon him. Nevertheless, the
trustee is liable if one of the actions specified in section 405(a)
occurs. "0
Section 405(c) permits allocations between named fiduciaries
similar to the allocation of responsibilities between cotrustees pro-
vided by section 405(b). Pursuant to this section, named fiduciaries
may allocate fiduciary responsibilities pursuant to specific proce-
dures enumerated in the plan. Further, a named fiduciary may
delegate certain of his fiduciary responsibilities or obligations to
other individuals. If such allocation or designation is made and is
implemented in a prudent manner for the exclusive benefit of the
participants and beneficiaries, the named fiduciary is not liable for
the acts or omissions of persons to whom responsibilities have been
allocated or designated. The named fiduciary allocating or desig-
nating such duties and responsibilities shall have a continuing duty
to review the performance of a person to whom duties have been
delegated. Review may be made periodically or continually.'4 '
Nevertheless, the fiduciary is not relieved of his duties under sec-
tion 405(a), with respect to cofiduciary liability, merely because he
is relieved of liability by allocating or designating duties to other
persons.
Finally, if a named fiduciary has appointed an investment
manager to manage assets of the plan pursuant to section 402(c)(3),
a trustee shall have no liability for the acts or omissions of the
investment manager. An investment manager is defined as a fidu-
137. Id. at 299-300.
138. ERISA § 405(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
139. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 300.
140. ERISA § 405(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
141. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 301.
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ciary other than a trustee or named fiduciary who has the power to
manage, control, and dispose of a plan's assets and who is a regis-
tered investment advisor under the Investment Advisor's Act of
1940. An investment manager also may be a bank or insurance
company.4 2 Nothing in ERISA prohibits a fiduciary or trustee from
seeking investment advice from any individual. Of course, the fidu-
ciary is liable for his actions in reliance upon such advice. On the
other hand, if an investment manager is appointed, the trustee has
no liability with regard to the management of the fund assets.
VI. SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS
A. Diversification
Several fiduciaries, especially corporate fiduciaries, have ex-
pressed concern with regard to the diversification requirement. A
particular concern is whether satisfying the diversification require-
ment mandates that the fiduciary invest in more than one type of
asset. For example, is the fiduciary required to invest in real estate
rather than solely in a stock portfolio? As mentioned above, the
diversification requirement apparently is designed to prevent a fidu-
ciary from placing all of the plan's assets "in one basket." While this
interpretation is supported by several provisions of ERISA, it is
evident in the phrase "to minimize the risk of large losses."'' There-
fore an investment of one hundred percent of the plan's assets in
common stock, so long as the portfolio itself was diversified, would
not appear to violate the diversification rules. Similarly, an invest-
ment of one hundred percent of the assets of the plan in real estate
would not be a violation of the diversification rules, so long as the
parcels were geographically dispersed and capable of use in different
industries. In considering the diversification rules, the prudence
requirements and other fiduciary standards clearly must be applied.
B. Qualifying Employer Real Property
A second concern expressed by professional fiduciaries is that
the term qualifying employer real property is limited unduly. Be-
cause of the geographical dispersion requirement, fiduciaries fear
that few plans are able to take advantage of the section 407 exemp-
tions. It is unfortunate that section 407 is so constricted. Excellent
investments for pension plans might be made in certain employer
real property. This is especially true in the case of large, economi-
142. ERISA § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (Supp. V 1975).
143. Id. § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
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cally stable companies. Certainly such investments shall be allowed
to the extent that the prudence and diversification requirements
are met. The limited nature of section 407 appears to be Congress's
reaction to abuses that might occur because of the close relationship
and possible conflicts of interest that arise when the plan is the
landlord of the employer sponsor. There is little doubt that such
abuses have occurred. The reaction of Congress to the proposed
ESOP regulations, however, may provide some guidance in this
area. Congress indicated that the Labor Secretary and the Treasury
Secretary should direct their attention to the area of particular
abuse without making blanket rules that would restrict the use of
pension plans. Perhaps Congress should follow its own advice and
reconsider the limitations of section 407. With the new stronger
fiduciary standards and the liberal provisions related to the initia-
tion of actions, less stringent limitations are appropriate.
C. Directed Investments
While the Act provides absolute immunity to fiduciaries in
plans that allow participants to exercise independent judgment and
direct investments of their own accounts,"' trustees have no such
immunity in the case of investments directed by the investment
committee or other fiduciaries. In such cases, the trustee is immune
only if he is subject to the direction of a named fiduciary who is not
a trustee, if he follows the proper directions of such fiduciary, and
such directions are not contrary to the labor title. Such an exemp-
tion is of little value since the trustee must review every direction
to make sure that it conforms with the terms of the plan and is not
prohibited by the labor title. Extreme concern has been expressed
by corporate trustees in this area. Many corporate trustees, in fact,
have declined to serve as trustees under plans that have such a
provision. These trustees are not willing to accept the liability for
reviewing all investments and directions in cases in which they are
subject to an investment committee's direction. The banks will
serve as custodians for the funds rather than trustees and thereby
avoid this type of liability. If a named fiduciary appoints an invest-
ment manager, the trustee is relieved of any responsibility or liabil-
ity for investment decision."'
144. Id. § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (Supp. V 1975).
145. Id. § 405(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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D. Life Insurance
A final area that has caused considerable problems in the ad-
ministration of plans and in the application of fiduciary duties in-
volves the transfer of life insurance policies. When a plan is initiated
by an employer, especially a small employer such as a professional
corporation, participants often have existing life insurance policies
that they would like to place into the pension plan. Immediately,
the problem of a prohibited transaction under section 406 arises.
Such transfers were common practice prior to ERISA. Similarly, it
was a common practice for employers who were already maintaining
individual life insurance contracts on the lives of certain employees
to transfer these policies to a newly established pension plan. By
making such a transfer, the participants were maintaining a lower
cost since the existing policies were issued at an earlier age. In
addition, participants who had become uninsurable or a rated insur-
ance risk since the issuance of the existing insurance would main-
tain insurance coverage. Finally, the initial cost of insurance, which
includes substantial commissions and other fees, was avoided since
new insurance was not issued.
A similar problem arises with regard to the transfer of policies
from plans to participants. Such transfers normally arise in the fol-
lowing situations: (1) when a participant terminates service without
any vested right in his account; (2) when a plan that previously was
funded using life insurance contracts for all or a portion of the
investments decides to convert its funding methods; and (3) upon
the termination of a plan, when the participant wishes to leave his
account in trust until retirement or rollover his account to an indi-
vidual retirement account, thereby postponing the tax conse-
quences. In the first two instances, the participant may wish to
purchase his insurance contract from the plan because of an inter-
vening physical problem that makes the participant presently unin-
surable or substandard rated. The participant therefore wishes to
continue the valuable coverage afforded by the insurance policy
issued at an earlier age when such a physical problem did not exist.
In the third situation, if the participant wishes to continue in the
trust until retirement before receiving his benefits, the policy proba-
bly will lapse because of a lack of funds to pay the premiums. Thus,
if he were able to purchase the policy, the participant could con-
tinue the protection, at the same time allowing his retirement bene-
fits to remain in trust until he reaches retirement age. On the other
hand, if the participant seeks to receive his benefits in a lump sum
payment and transfer the benefits into an individual retirement
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account and thereby defer tax liability, the presence of an insurance
contract in the distribution creates a problem. The rollover rules
require that all of the assets received in the lump sum distribution
be transferred to the individual retirement account.'46 Most compa-
nies that maintain individual retirement accounts, however, are
unwilling to accept life insurance policies as an asset. Therefore the
presence of the life insurance policy prevents the participant from
taking advantage of this valuable planning technique. A solution for
the participant might be to purchase the life insurance contract
from the plan and then receive a lump sum distribution that in-
cludes the money he paid for the policy. These funds then can be
rolled over in liquid form to an individual retirement account. Thus
the participant realizes a deferral of tax consequences, while main-
taining his insurance protection.
In recognition of the problems created by the prohibited trans-
action rules and the need for an exemption under the administrative
provisions for such transfers, the Departments of Treasury and
Labor issued two proposed class exemptions on January 14, 1977.147
The two proposed exemptions are in response to numerous requests
for individual exemptions received from the insurance industry and
individual plans and participants. The proposed class exemption
dealing with the transfer of individual life insurance contracts from
employers or participants to employee benefit plans contains these
basic requirements:
(1) the plan must be a defined contribution plan or an em-
ployee welfare benefit plan;
(2) the plan must pay no more than the cash surrender value
of the contract;
(3) the transfer may not involve any contract subject to a mort-
gage or lien which the plan assumes;
(4) the transfer must not be contrary to a provision of the plan
or trust; and
(5) with regard to an employee welfare benefit plan, the plan
must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees
or officers and directors.
The proposed class exemption involving the transfer of individ-
ual life insurance contracts from employee benefit plans to partici-
pants provides for the following requirements:
146. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5).
147. ERISA Proposed Class Exemptions Involving Transfer of Individual Life Insurance
Contracts, 42 Fed. Reg. 4034 (1977).
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(1) the participant is the insured under the contract;
(2) the contract would, but for the sale, be surrendered by the
plan;
(3) the amount received by the plan as consideration is at least
equal to the amount necessary to put the plan in the position it
would have been had it surrendered the contract and made any
distribution owing to the participants of a vested interest in the
plan; and
(4) in the case of an employee welfare benefit plan, the plan
must not discriminate in favor of participants who are officers,
shareholders, or highly compensated employees.
These two exemptions are needed and should provide addi-
tional flexibility to trustees, fiduciaries, and participants in the
planning of insurance as it relates to the pension plan. The proposed
class exemptions are retroactive in effect with an effective date of
January 1, 1975.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 creates
a new body of federal statutory law and, in time, will provide a
broad new area of federal common law. It is incumbent upon all who
serve the pension industry to educate themselves with regard to the
new fiduciary standards. The broad definitions of fiduciary, the
severe limitations on party in interest transactions, the liberaliza-
tion of procedural rules allowing for suits by participants and bene-
ficiaries, and new enforcement techniques available to the Treasury
and the Labor Department provide a labyrinth that must be navi-
gated by fiduciaries and their advisors. On the other hand, the Act
appears to provide new opportunities for the educated fiduciary,
trustee, and pension advisor.
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